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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Respondent,
v.
JOHNNY WADE DRAWN,
:

Case No. 890253-CA
Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant.
INTRODUCTION
In an opinion filed on May 2, 1990, this Court affirmed
Appellant's conviction for aggravated robbery and Appellant's
sentences for that conviction and violation of the firearm
enhancement statute.

A copy of that opinion is attached as

Appendix A.
Because that opinion failed to address issues and case
law raised by Appellant, misstated and omitted material facts,
and diverged from controlling federal precedent, rehearing is
1
necessary.
ARGUMENT
I.
THIS COURT FAILED TO REMEDY
THE VIOLATION OF APPELLANT'S
RIGHT TO CONFRONTATION.
A. THE OPINION OMITS THE ISSUE CONCERNING THE TRIAL COURT'S
PROHIBITING APPELLANT'S DEMONSTRATION OF THE DISHONEST BEHAVIOR
OF OFFICER EDWARDS AND THE TRIAL COURT'S BOLSTERING OF OFFICER
EDWARDS' CREDIBILITY.
1
For explanation of circumstances in which the right to
rehearing is exercised, see Utah Court of Appeals Rule 35; Brown
v. Pickard, denying reh'g, 11 P. 512 (Utah 1886); Cummings v.
Nielson, 129 P. 619 (Utah 1913).
1

In Appellant's reply brief, Appellant noted that
defense counsel was not allowed to present testimony that Officer
Edwards had behaved in a dishonest manner, and that the trial
court improperly bolstered the credibility of Officer Edwards*

2

Reply brief at page 4 and 5. At oral argument on January 23,
1990, Appellate counsel, cited to this Court the United States
Supreme Court case, Kentucky v. Stincer, 428 U.S. 730 (1987), for
the proposition that in blocking this impeachment of Officer
Edwards, the trial court violated Appellant's right to
confrontation.
2
Officer Edwards presented Appellant's alleged
confession, as well as the two exculpatory statements of Genora
Mar and Rosemary Marcellus (T. 148-160). During direct
examination of a defense witness, Appellant's counsel was
prohibited from establishing that Officer Edwards had called that
witness, misrepresenting that he was calling on behalf of defense
counsel (T.2 54). Cutting off this line of questioning, Judge
Young raised and sustained a hearsay objection, although it is
obvious that defense counsel was not attempting to establish the
truth of the assertion that Officer Edwards was calling on behalf
of defense counsel (T.2 54). See Utah Rule of Evidence 801(c)
("'Hearsay' is a statement, other than one made by the declarant
while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to
prove the truth of the matter asserted.").
The Court bolstered Officer Edwards' testimony
immediately prior to his recitation of the statements of
Appellant, Rosemary Mar, and Genora Marcellus, instructing the
jurors, "[Y]ou may [acjcept that as though that witness were
testifying." (T. 150).
3
In Stincer, the Court defined two "two broad, albeit
not exclusive categories of cases in which the Confrontation
Clause is violated: "cases involving the admission of out-ofcourt statements and cases involving restrictions imposed by law
or by the trial court on the scope of cross-examination.". Id.
at 737 (emphasis added). While the trial court's ruling cut off
Appellant's direct examination, the effect of the ruling was to
prohibit Appellant from impeaching Officer Edwards, and falls
within the rationale of the Stincer opinion. See Stincer at 738739 (discussing how the Confrontation Clause prohibits the
prohibition of questioning eliciting facts bearing on credibility
2

This Court did not mention this in its opinion.

See

Appendix A.
B. INASMUCH AS THE HONESTY OF OFFICER EDWARDS WAS ESSENTIAL TO
THE VIABILITY OF THE "CONFESSIONS" SUPPORTING THE VERDICT, AS
WELL AS TO THE FINDING OF UNAVAILABILITY OF THE HEARSAY
DECLARANTS, THE ISSUE IS DETERMINATIVE AND MUST BE ADDRESSED.
In contravention of the Utah Supreme Court's
admonitions in State v. Carter, 776 P.2d 886, 891 (Utah 1989),
that confessions should be presented through reliable means, the
State presented the confession of Appellant and in-custody
statements of Genora Marcellus and Rosemary Mar through Officer
Ron Edwards. After Appellant had argued that his confession
never happened and objected to the presentation of the
"confession" through Officer Edwards (S.H. 22-23), the trial
court improperly bolstered the credibility of Officer Edwards
prior to his recitation of the in-custody statements, instructing
the jurors, "[Y]ou may [ac]cept [his testimony] as though that
witness were testifying." (T. 150).
Not only were the jurors left to rely exclusively on
the improperly bolstered and protected honesty of Officer
Edwards in assessing the in-custody statements of Rosemary Mar,
Genora Marcellus, and Appellant, but also, the trial court relied
heavily on Officer Edwards in finding that Rosemary Mar and

of witnesses)•
Further, inasmuch as Officer Edwards' testimony was the
basis of the trial court's ruling that Genora Marcellus and
Rosemary Mar were unavailable, and that their hearsay statements
could be admitted, the inability of Appellant to demonstrate the
dishonesty of Officer Edwards had an additional impact on his
right to confront Genora Marcellus and Rosemary Mar.
3

Genora Marcellus were unavailable witnesses. When this Court
followed suit# without any mention of the dishonest behavior of
Officer Edwards and without mention of the improper bolstering of
4
Officer Edwards by the trial court, this Court failed to a
address a determinative issue and determinative facts.
C. IN CHARACTERIZING THE "CONFESSIONS" OF ROSEMARY MAR AND GENORA
MARCELLUS AS STATEMENTS AGAINST PENAL INTEREST, THIS COURT
MISSTATED UNDISPUTED FACTS, MISINTERPRETED UTAH RULE OF EVIDENCE
804(b)(3), AND DIVERGED FROM BINDING FEDERAL PRECEDENT.
In finding that Appellant's right to confrontation
under the federal constitution was not violated, this Court erred
in relying on extrinsic evidence to find the hearsay statements
of Genora Marcellus and Rosemary Mar reliable, and in finding
that the hearsay statements fit within a well-recognized
exception to the hearsay rule, characterizing the statements the
declarants intended to exculpate themselves as "confessions" and
"statements against penal interest".
4
See Appendix A, page 6 ("Detective Edwards also called
Marcellus1 s home and spoke with the witness's mother. The
witness's mother told the officer that he daughter had received
the subpoena and would be in court on the designated date.
Detective Edwards also testified that he was "unable to locate
[Mar] at all." Her last known address was listed as Redwood Road
apartment complex. A check of the apartment indicated that Mar
no longer lived there. Detective Edwards's search for Mar
further consisted of questioning police informants, searching
police files, and working with a Salt Lake County
investigator.").
5
See Appendix A at page 7, quoting Ohio v. Roberts, 448
U.S. 56, 66 (1980), ("'Reliability can be inferred without more
in a case where the evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay
exception. In other cases, the evidence must be excluded at
least absent a showing of particularized guarantees of
trustworthiness.'").
This Court stated:
When the statements were made, Mar and
4

1. THE RELIABILITY OF HEARSAY STATEMENTS MUST BE FOUND IN THE
CIRCUMSTANCES IN WHICH THE STATEMENTS WERE MADE,
In evaluating the reliability of the statements, this
Court erred in looking to evidence supporting the verdict that
was completely unrelated to the circumstances in which the
statements were made.
opinion in footnote 5.

See emphasized portion of this Court's
The impropriety of this approach can be

understood through reference to

Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530,

544-545 (1986)(evaluating the "circumstances surrounding the
confession"); State v. Nelson, 725 P.2d 1353, 1355-1356 n.3 (the
Marcellus were under arrest and suspects in
the Payless robbery. Their statements were
substantially similar. Furthermore, other
witnesses observed a white station wagon
leaving the crime scene, a black man exiting
the vehicle before it was pulled over by
police, and the police discovered money and
the shotgun near the arrest scene. [Both
Marcellus and Mar also told Edwards that they
were waiting in the car when defendant came
running back and said that he had "just
robbed a store." The two then stated that
defendant got into the car, Marcellus drove
away, and defendant was let out of the car
before the police detained and arrested the
two women. Furthermore, both women admitted
disposing of the money and shotgun before
being arrested.] The declarations implicated
defendant, but also subjected the two women
to prosecution as accomplices. See Utah Code
Ann. section 76-2-202 (1978)(any person who
aids another in commission of a crime is
criminally liable as a party). The witnesses
also aided defendant's escape and disposed of
incriminating evidence. The State could have
prosecuted the two women for the robbery.
The statements of the women were made against
penal interest and there was no error in
admitting them through the testimony of
Detective Edwards.
Appendix A page 8 (emphasis added; bracketed portion appears in
footnote 5 of this Court's opinion).
5

court explained that under Utah Code Ann. section 76-5-411(2), in
determining the reliability of hearsay statements in child sex
abuse prosecutions, the court should consider factors surrounding
the making of the statement: "how soon after the event it was
given, whether the statement was spontaneous, the questions asked
to elicit it, the number of times the statement was repeated or
rehearsed, and whether the statement is reproduced verbatim in
court, viz., tape recording, video tape or otherwise."); and
State v. Ryan, 691 P.2d 197, 204 (Wash. 1984)("Adequate indicia
of reliability must be found in reference to circumstances
surrounding the making of the out-of-court statement, and not
from subsequent corroboration of the criminal act.").
2. THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE MAKING OF THE HEARSAY
STATEMENTS DO NOT SUPPORT A FINDING OF RELIABILITY.
The circumstances surrounding the statements of
Rosemary Mar and Genora Marcellus counsel twice against a finding
of reliability of those statements: as "confessions" of
6
accomplices, the statements are presumed unreliable; and the
circumstances surrounding the making of the statements do not
overcome this presumption.
Finding that the statements were made at all, let alone
ascertaining the circumstances in which the statements were
made, requires reference to the improperly bolstered and
protected testimony of Officer Edwards.

See subpoint B, supra.

Officer Edwards testified that after being briefed on

6

Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. at 539.
6

the case by Officers Newbold and Halverson, he read Rosemary and
Genora their Miranda rights, and interviewed them without
recording the statements (he claimed the tape recorder was not
used at their request) (T.I 148-154).

Compare Lee at 544 ("The

unsworn statement was given in response to the questions of
police, who, having already interrogated Lee# no doubt knew what
they were looking for, and the statement was not tested in any
manner by contemporaneous cross-examination by counsel, or its
equivalent.").

Further, the two statements diverged on the

critical issue of responsibility for the crime;

both of these

witnesses were minimizing their participation and had ample
Q

reason to amplify Appellant's responsibility for the crime.
3. THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT WAS CORRECT IN RULING THAT
STATEMENTS OF ACCOMPLICES ARE NOT "STATEMENTS AGAINST PENAL
INTEREST" FOR PURPOSES OF CONFRONTATION CLAUSE ANALYSIS; BECAUSE
THE STATEMENTS WERE EXCULPATORY, THEY DO NOT QUALIFY UNDER THE
RATIONALE OR RULE OF "STATEMENTS AGAINST PENAL INTEREST."
In characterizing the statements of Rosemary Mar and
7
See Appellee1s brief, page 25 n. 9, listing the
differences between the statements ("(1) witness foreknowledge of
the robbery; (2) participation in 'casing1 the store; and (3)
which participant wanted the robbery committed. A fourth
possible area, also insignificant, is where the car was parked
prior to the robbery.").
8
Compare Lee at 545 ("As we have consistently
recognized, a codefendant*s confession is presumptively
unreliable as to the passages detailing the defendant's conduct
or culpability because those passages may well be the product of
the codefendant's desire to shift or spread the blame, curry
favor, avenge himself, or divert attention to another. If those
portions of the codefendant's purportedly 'interlocking'
statement which bear to any significant degree on the defendant's
participation in the crime are not thoroughly substantiated by
the defendant's own confession, the admission of those statements
poses too serious a threat to the accuracy of the verdict to be
countenanced by the Sixth Amendment.").
7

Genora Marcellus as "statements against penal interest", this
Court was explicitly relying on the federal Sixth Amendment,9
and yet diverged from the United States Supreme Court ruling that
for purposes of federal Confrontation Clause analysis, statements
of accomplices do not satisfy the reliability prong of that
analysis by falling within the "statements against penal
^ - 10
interest" rubric.
In citing the Utah Code (section 76-2-202) for the
proposition that Rosemary Mar and Genora Marcellus could have
11
been prosecuted as accomplices for the robbery,
this Court
omitted the foundational analysis justifying the "statements
against interest" exception to the hearsay rule.

The content of

the Utah Code and what a prosecutor could do with the statements
are not at issue; rather, the state of mind of the hearsay
declarant must demonstrate that the statement is so far against
her interest that if it were not true, she would not have made
i•4.
t . 12

9

Appendix A page 5 n.2.

10
See Lee at 544 n. 5 ("We reject respondent's
categorization of the hearsay involved in this case as a simple
•declaration against penal interest.' That concept defines too
large a class for meaningful Confrontation Clause analysis."
11

Appendix A page 8.

12
See Utah Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3) ("A statement which
at the time of its making so far contrary to the declarant's
pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so far tended to subject
him to civil or criminal liability, ... that a reasonable man in
his position would not have made the statement unless he believed
it to be true.); State v. Sanders, 496 P.2d 270, 273 (Utah
1972)(prospect of damage to hearsay declarant substitutes for the
reliability showing traditionally made through cross8

Genora Marcellus and Rosemary Mar were not
magnanimously confessing to a crime# they were trying to
exculpate themselves (T.2 151-154).

Because there is nothing in

the record demonstrating that Genora and Rosemary bore the
requisite state of mind when the statements were made # there is
nothing to support the trial court's or this Court's
characterization of the statements as "against penal interest."
Appellant requests rehearing of the issue of the denial
of his right to confrontation.
II.
THIS COURT FAILED TO REMEDY
THE VIOLATION OF APPELLANT'S
RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS.
A. THIS COURT APPLIED AN EXCESSIVELY DEFERENTIAL STANDARD OF
REVIEW.
As noted at oral argument and omitted from this Court's
opinion, after defense counsel objected to Micki Horn's in-court
identification of Appellant, apparently the only black man
wearing shackles at the defense table in court (see Reply Brief
at page 7 ) , the trial court did not pause to analyze what this
Court took two pages to discuss, but simply allowed the
identification, stating, "If she has any independent recollection
she can testify to it." (T.57).
In applying the deferential "abuse of discretion"
standard of review, this Court granted more deference than was
due and failed to remind the trial court that in presiding over
criminal cases, he should engage himself mentally and consider
examination).
9

legal rulings within the analytical framework established by
appellate courts.
B. THIS COURT OMITTED DETERMINATIVE FACTS.
The State has never disputed that facts appearing in
the record in this case: at the time that Micki Horn made her
in-court identification of Appellant, he was the only black man
in shackles sitting at the defense table (Reply Brief page 7 ) .
After acknowledging the impropriety of the in-court
13
identification,

this Court characterized the trial court's

careless allowance of the in-court identification as a proper act
14
of discretion*

This Court then supported this imaginary act of

discretion, implicitly affirming ruling that was never made, by
omitting and misstating facts in the record.
This Court relied on the language of Micki Horn in
determining that she had an independent recollection of
Appellant:
Well, when I walked in I sat down and he
turned around and it hit me like a ton of
bricks. I recognized him. And that was it.
And everything about him—the features—I
just ... it was him. I just couldn't—I
don't know. But I recognized him. The way
he moved, the way his back was over, the
wrinkles on the forehead, his nose,
everything.
(T. 57-58; Appendix A page 3 ) . This Court further substantiated
13

Appendix A page 4.

14
See Appendix A page 4 ("We will not reverse a trial
court's evidentiary rulings absent a showing that the lower court
abused its discretion."); and page 5 ("We find no abuse of
discretion in admitting this evidence.").
10

the finding that Ms. Horn had an independent recollection:
The salesperson's in-court identification
focused not on defendant's face, but rather
on his features, movements, and forehead
wrinkles. In her statement to police, made
on the day of the robbery, she stated that
the robber "wasn't white," that his "hair and
skin was [sic] a little dark," and the
suspect was possibly hispanic or Mexican.
Defendant is in fact a light-skinned black
man. The witness was also looking at his
face "the whole time" during the robbery.
Appendix A page 4.
The problem with the analysis is that there is no basis
for the Court's assumption that the recollection stemmed from the
robbery, rather than from the lineup, which Ms. Horn attended
4.

4.

'

1

1 5

prior to trial.
During the robbery, the assailant wore two nylons over
his head and wielded a sawed-off shotgun (T. 51-52).

Viewing

Defense Exhibit 2, this Court can see that Appellant was neither
wearing two nylons on his head nor wielding a sawed-off shotgun
at the lineup (nor was the person Ms. Horn identified at the
line-up or any other participant).

While Ms. Horn explained

that she had her child with her and wasn't wearing her glasses at
the line-up (T. 56, 67), perhaps her being spun around and
dragged through the Payless store at gunpoint by someone wearing
two nylons on the head, and her fumbling with the cash register
and monitoring two customers and a fellow employee in the store
during the robbery (T. 52-55) were as distracting to her as were
15
Ms. Horn could not remember if Appellant was in the
lineup (T. 61).
11

the presence of her child and the absence of her glasses at the
16
line-up.
While this Court indicated that "The witness was also
17
looking at his face 'the whole time1 during the robbery",
the
record reflects a much more limited examination of Appellant's
face during the robbery:
Q Did you ever get a look at this
individual's face?
A Yes, I did, a good look.
Q When?
A When he was pointing the gun at me
telling me if I set off the alarm and he was
going to blow me in half I was looking right
at his face the whole time.
Q That was through the nylon stockings?
A Yes.
(T. 55).
This Court's footnote indicating that any error present
18
was cured by the Long instruction
must be reconsidered in light
of the fact that Ms. Horn was the first witness to testify, and
19
expressed a great deal of certainty in her identification.
Appellant requests rehearing of the issue of the denial
16
There is apparently nothing in the record to indicate
that she was wearing her glasses during the robbery or at trial.
Indeed, if Ms. Horn was wearing her glasses at trial, it is
curious that she had to explain to the jurors, "I wear glasses
and I didn't have my glasses on [at the lineup].11 TTT
67)(emphasis added).
17

Appendix A page 4.

18

Appendix A page 4 n.l.

19
See State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483, 490-492 and n.5 (Utah
1986)(Explaining that jurors don't follow these instructions, and
explaining that research supports the assertion that "[T]he
accuracy of an identification is, a times, inversely related to
the confidence with which it is made.").
12

of his right to due process.
III.
THIS COURT FAILED TO PROTECT
APPELLANT'S RIGHTS AGAINST
DOUBLE JEOPARDY.
This Court upheld the trial court's dual consecutive
sentences for Appellant's use of a firearm during a robbery,
noting the legislative intent for "imposing an additional
20
penalty when a firearm is used in a commission of a felony."
Appellant requests this Court to address the issue
raised on pages 39 through 42 of his opening brief and pages 17
and 18 of his reply brief, namely: if the firearm enhancement
statute does not create a new crime and impose a redundant
punishment (in violation of Double Jeopardy principles), why#
after finding that the actus reus of using a firearm during the
robbery was committed/ and after imposing the sentence for
aggravated robbery, was it lawful for the trial court impose a
separate, consecutive sentence for that actus reus under the
firearm "enhancement" statute?

See Utah Code Ann. section 76-6

302 (1978); section 76-3-203; State v. Stilling, 770 P.2d 137
(Utah 1989); and State v. Angus, 581 P.2d 992 (Utah 1978).
CONCLUSION
I hereby certify that the foregoing petition is
submitted in good faith and not for delay.
JAMES A. VALDEZ'
Attorney for Appellant

20

Appendix A pages 8-9.
13

Attorney fc^r Appellant
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I, Elizabeth Holbrook, hereby certify that

\) copies

of the foregoing will be delivered to the Utah Court of Appeals
and that four copies of the foregoing will be delivered to the
Attorney General's Office# 236. State Capitol, Salt Lake City#
Utah, 84114 ,

this h

day of

this

DELIVERED by
day of

1990.

14

APPENDIX A
OPINION OF THE COURT

FILED
w»»yT.Noon«n

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

Njfcrk of * * Court
Uttft C«uft * Appeals

OOOOO

State of Utah#
Plaintiff and Appellee/

OPINION
(For Publication)

v.
Johnny Wade Drawn,

Case No. 890253-CA

Defendant and Appellant.

Third District/ Salt Lake County
The Honorable David S. Young
Attorneys:

James A. Valdez and Elizabeth Holbrook# Salt Lake
City# for Appellant
R. Paul Van Dam and Charlene Barlow# Salt Lake
City, for Appellee

Before Judges Davidson, Billings/ and Orme.
DAVIDSON, Judge:
Defendant appeals his conviction of aggravated robbery. He
argues that the trial court erred by failing to suppress a
witness's in-court identification of defendant/ by admitting
hearsay statements of unavailable witnesses/ and by enhancing
his sentence for the use of a firearm. We affirm.
On August 21# 1988, a man entered the Payless Shoe Store
located in Magna, Utah# wearing pink-and beige-colored nylon
stockings over his head and carrying a sawed-off shotgun. Two
salespersons were working at the time. The man ordered one
salesperson to hand over all the money in the register and the
other salesperson to take all the money out of the safe and
place it in a corduroy bag. The salesperson working at the
register testified that she was looking at the man's face Mthe
whole time." The second salesperson only viewed the man
briefly.

After the robbery, a woman driving through the mall parking
lot observed a man wearing something pink on his head, running
alongside the Payless Shoe Store attempting to shove something
into a bag. The witness observed the man enter a small white
station wagon driven by a black woman and watched the car exit
the parking lot heading southbound on 5600 West and later
turning west on 3500 South. She reported this information to
the police after discovering that the shoe store had been
robbed. She later identified the car after the police had
detained the car and its occupants.
Several blocks from the robbery, a fourth witness observed
a light-skinned black man exit a white compact station wagon.
Several minutes later, he observed a police officer pull the
station wagon over and handcuff the vehicle's two remaining
female occupants. After observing this, he drove down the road
where he observed the same black man. The witness lost sight
of the man for about fifteen or twenty minutes, but later
observed the same man wearing different clothing. The witness
thereafter lost sight of the black man.
West Valley City Police Officer Kory Newbold responded to
the Payless robbery. While driving to Payless he observed a
possible suspect vehicle travelling in the opposite direction.
The officer turned around, and pursued the vehicle. He
momentarily lost sight of the vehicle but later found it on a
side street and pulled it over. He questioned the two black
female occupants, but released them because they did not match
the reported description. Upon returning to the patrol car,
the officer received updated information on the suspects and
getaway vehicle. With this knowledge, he again pulled the
vehicle over and this time arrested the occupants.
At the arrest scene, one witness identified the car as the
getaway vehicle, another recognized one of the women suspects
as having been in the shoe store earlier in the day. The bag
of money and the shotgun used in the robbery were also found
near the scene of arrest. At the police station, the two
suspects were interviewed by Detective Ron Edwards of the West
Valley City Police Department. Detective Edwards later
testified that both women admitted that they waited in the car
while defendant robbed the shoe store. Edwards also testified
that both women told him that after the robbery, they
momentarily evaded police, let defendant out, and threw the
money bag and gun out the window. Neither woman testified at
trial. Instead, their testimony was admitted through Detective
Edwards under the unavailability exception to the hearsay
rule. See Utah R. Evid. 804.
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Defendant was arrested the day after the robbery and was
questioned by Detective Edwards, Detective Edwards later
testified that defendant confessed to the robbery after asking
defendant's parole officer and another police officer to leave
the interrogation room. Neither the testimony of the two women
nor defendant's testimony was recorded.
Two lineups were held several weeks after the robbery.
None of the witnesses brought to the lineup could identify
defendant as the perpetrator of the crime. At trial, however,
one of the Payless employees identified defendant as the
robber. Over defendant's objections, her in-court
identification was allowed.
IN-COURT IDENTIFICATION
Defendant first argues that the court erred in not
suppressing the witness's in-court identification. He contends
that the identification, made while defendant was sitting at
counsel table, was impermissibly suggestive and denied him a
fair trial. Although the witness previously failed to identify
defendant at a lineup, at trial she claimed to have independent
recollection of defendant as the perpetrator of the crime:
Well, when I walked in I sat down and he
turned around and it hit me like a ton of
bricks. I recognized him. And that was
it. And everything about him—the
features—I just . . . it was him. I just
couldn't—I don't know. But I recognized
him. The way he moved, the way his back
was over, the wrinkles on the forehead,
his nose, everything.
The suggestiveness of the witness's in-court identification
is reviewed under the totality of the circumstances. Manson v.
Braithwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 113 (1977); Neil v. Bicrcrers, 409 U.S.
188, 199 (1972); State v. Thamer, 777 P.2d 432, 435 (Utah 1989);
State v. McCumber, 622 P.2d 353, 357 (Utah 1980). We apply a
two-part test to determine if identification procedures are
impermissibly suggestive:
[W]as [the identification procedure] so
impermissively suggestive as to give rise
to a very substantial likelihood of
irreparable misidentification . . . .
[I]f the [identification procedure was]
impermissibly suggestive, then the
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in-court identification must be based on
an untainted, independent foundation to be
reliable.
Thamer, 777 P.2d at 435. Here, the in-court identification was
suggestive and carried a likelihood of misidentification. See
State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483, 487-88 (Utah 1986). We therefore
apply the second prong of the Thamer test to determine if the
identification was -based on an untainted, independent
foundation."* Thamer, 777 P.2d at 435. We will not reverse a
trial court's evidentiary rulings absent a showing that the
lower court abused its discretion. See, e.g., State v. Barela,
779 P.2d 1140, 1142 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
In considering the likelihood of misidentification, we
review the following factors:
the opportunity of the witness to view the
criminal at the time of the crime, the
witness' [s] degree of attention, the
accuracy of the witnesses] prior
description of the criminal, the level of
certainty demonstrated by the witness at
the confrontation, and the length of time
between the crime and the confrontation.
Long. 721 P.2d at 491 (quoting Neilr 409 U.S. at 199).'
The salesperson^ in-court identification focused not on
defendant's face, but rather on his features, movements, and
forehead wrinkles. In her statement to police, made on the day
of the robbery, she stated that the robber -wasn't white,- that
his -hair and skin was [sic] a little dark,- and the suspect
was possibly hispanic or Mexican. Defendant is in fact a
light-skinned black man. The witness was also looking at his
face -the whole time- during the robbery. There is no serious
inconsistency between the prior description and the subsequent
in-court identification to make the identification
unreliable.1
1. In addition, any possible error attributable to the alleged
misidentification was cured by the detailed jury instruction
which properly appraised the jury of the inherent limitations
of eyewitness identification. The instruction given in this
case was taken verbatim from State v. Long. 721 P.2d at 494
n.8. The Utah Supreme Court expressly approved this
instruction as satisfying the need for cautionary instructions
in eyewitness identification cases.
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While defendant's presence at counsel table may have been
suggestive, we cannot say that under the totality of
circumstances there was Ha very substantial likelihood of
irreparable misidentification," since an adequate independent
basis for the identification exists. Manson, 432 U.S. at 116
(quoting Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 390 (1968)).
-The defect, if there be one, goes to weight and not to
substance.- Id. at 117. We find no abuse of discretion in
admitting this evidence.
ADMISSION OF HEARSAY STATEMENTS
Defendant next argues that the trial court abused its
discretion by admitting the hearsay statements of Rosemary Mar
and Genova Marcellus, the two women arrested in the getaway
car. He contends that the State neither proved unavailability
nor that the testimony bore sufficient indicia of reliability.
He maintains that admission of this evidence violates his right
to confrontation guaranteed by the sixth amendment to the
United States Constitution and article I section 12 of the Utah
Constitution.2
Hearsay statements of a witness are admissible at trial
provided the State can show the witness's unavailability and
prove that the statement bears adequate indicia of
reliability. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980); State v.
Chapman, 655 P.2d 1119, 1121 (Utah 1982); State v. Brooks. 638
P.2d 537 (Utah 1981); Barela, 779 P.2d at 1142; Utah R. Evid.
804. With narrow exceptions, the confrontation clause
guarantees the accused "the right . . . to be confronted with
the witnesses against him . . . .* U.S. Const, amend. VI.
Indeed, in the usual case, the State "must either produce, or
demonstrate the unavailability of, the declarant whose
statement it wishes to use against defendant." Roberts. 448
U.S. at 65; £££ also Webb. 779 P.2d at 1113.
Utah R. Evid. 804(a)(5) provides:
-Unavailability as a witness" includes
situations in which the declarant:
2. Defendant does not contend that the analysis under the Utah
Constitution is any different from the analysis under the
federal constitution. We therefore review his argument under
the federal constitution. State v. Webb. 779 P.2d 1108, 1111
n.4 (Utah 1989).
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(5) is absent from the hearing and the
proponent of his statement has been unable
to procure his attendance by process or
other reasonable means.
A declarant is not unavailable as a
witness if his exemption/ refusal/ claim
of lack of memory/ inability/ or absence
is due to the procurement or wrongdoing of
the proponent of his statement for the
purpose of preventing the witness from
attending or testifying.
The State bears the burden of proving unavailability by
competent evidence. Barela, 779 P.2d at 1142. M[F]or a
witness to be constitutionally unavailable, it must be
practically impossible to produce the witness in court. It is
not enough to show that the witness would be uncomfortable on
the stand or that testifying would be stressful." I£. at
1142-43 (quoting Webb, 779 P.2d at 1113).
Here, the deputy county attorney subpoenaed each witness
three times prior to trial.3 Detective Edwards also called
Marcellus's home and spoke with the witness's mother. The
witness's mother told the officer that her daughter had
received the subpoena and would be in court on the designated
date. Detective Edwards also testified that he was "unable to
locate [Mar] at all." Her last known address was listed as a
Redwood Road apartment complex. A check of the apartment
indicated that Mar no longer lived there. -Detective Edwards's
search for Mar further consisted of questioning police
informants/ searching police files/ and working with a Salt
Lake County investigator. All of his efforts were unsuccessful.
We conclude that the State's efforts comply with the
hearsay exception unavailability requirements. See Webb, 779
P.2d at 1113, The State subpoenaed each witness several times,
attempted to make personal contact/ and used informants and
3. The Marcellus subpoenas were sent to the home of the
witness's mother. Subsequent communications between the county
attorney's office and Marcellus's mother indicate that
Marcellus/ who was defendant's friend/ received the subpoenas
and intended to attend the trial. The Mar subpoenas were sent
to her last known address but were returned by the post office
as undeliverable.
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other police resources to locate them, all of which proved
unsuccessful. Despite the State's good faith efforts neither
witness could be located nor produced in court. See icl.
We next determine if the unavailable witness statements
bear adequate -indicia of reliability.- -Reliability can be
inferred without more in a case where the evidence falls within
a firmly rooted hearsay exception. In other cases, the
evidence must be excluded at least absent a showing of
particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.- Roberts, 448
U.S. at 66. The State contends that the witnesses made
statements against their penal interest which fall within a
rooted hearsay exception.
Utah R. Evid. 804(b)(3) provides:
The following are not excluded by the
hearsay rule if the declarant is
unavailable as a witness:
(3) A statement which was at the time of
its making so far contrary to the
declarant's pecuniary or proprietary
interest, or so far tended to subject him
to civil or criminal liability, . . . that
a reasonable man in his position would not
have made the statement unless he believed
it to be true. A statement tending to
expose the declarant to criminal liability
and offered to exculpate the accused is
not admissible unless corroborating
circumstances clearly indicate the
trustworthiness of the statement.
In determining if a statement is one made against penal
interest/ we look to the circumstances-y<:nder which the statement
was given. See E. Cleary, McCormick on Evidence § 279 (3rd ed.
1984). Statements that would not subject a person to criminal
liability, Utah R. Evid. 804(b)(3), or statements made in an
obvious attempt to curry favor with the authorities by
inculpating defendant and exculpating declarant, lack
trustworthiness.4 See Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 541
4. Some jurisdictions have imposed additional safeguards by
requiring both inculpatory and exculpatory statements to be
corroborated. See E. Cleary, McCormick on Evidence § 279 (1984).
See also United States v. Casamento, 887 F.2d 1141, 1170 (2d Cir.
1989).
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(1986) (codefendant's confession, which was given only after he
was told defendant had implicated him, was presumptively
unreliable); Fed, R. Evid. 804, Notes of Advisory Committee on
Proposed Rules,
We review the trial judge's admission of this evidence
under the clear abuse of discretion standard. Brooks. 638 P.2d
at 539 (Utah 1981).
We find no abuse of discretion in the admission of the
hearsay statements. When the statements were made, Mar and
Marcellus were under arrest and suspects in the Payless
robbery. Their statements were substantially similar.
Furthermore, other witnesses observed a white station wagon
leaving the crime scene, a black man exiting the vehicle before
it was pulled over by police, and the police discovered money
and the shotgun near the arrest scene.* The declarations
implicated defendant, but also subjected the two women to
prosecution as accomplices. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-202
(1978) (any person who aids another in commission of a crime is
criminally liable as a party). The witnesses also aided
defendant's escape and disposed of incriminating evidence. The
State could have prosecuted the two women for the robbery. The
statements of the women were made against penal interest and
there was no error in admitting them through the testimony of
Detective Edwards.
CUMULATIVE SENTENCES
Defendant next argues that the imposition of a five year
sentence for the use of a firearm in addition to the sentence
for aggravated robbery is impermissible. He argues that the
firearm enhancement cannot be applied where an element of the
underlying crime is the use of a firearm.
Both this court and the Utah Supreme Court have recently
ruled that imposition of the firearms enhancement penalty in
aggravated robbery cases is permissible and comports with the
legislature's intent in imposing an additional penalty when a
5. Both Marcellus and Mar also told Edwards that they were
waiting in the car when defendant came running back and said
that he had "just robbed a store.H The two then stated that
defendant got into the car, Marcellus drove away, and defendant
was let out of the car before the police detained and arrested
the two women. Furthermore, both women admitted disposing of
the money and shotgun before being arrested.
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firearm is used in the commission of a felony. State v. Russell,
132 Utah Adv. Rep. 14, 15 (Utah 1990); State v. Webb, 131 Utah
Adv. Rep. 41, 53-54 (Ct. App. 1990).
The legislature has clearly expressed its intention to more
severely punish all felons who use a firearm. Russell, 132 Utah
Adv. Rep. at 15. Defendant's sentence has not been doubly
enhanced in a manner inconsistent with the legislature's intent
nor is that intent ambiguous to any extent. Rather, he was
convicted of aggravated robbery but was given an enhanced
sentence because a firearm was used to commit the crime.
We find no error in the trial court's rulings and
accordingly affirm defendant's conviction and sentence.

Richard C. Davidson, Judge
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APPENDIX B
STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

United States Constitution, Amendment Six
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by
an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the
crime shall have been committed, which district shall
have been previously ascertained by law, and to be
confronted with the witnesses against him; to have
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his
favor, and to have the Assistance of counsel for his
defence.
Utah Code Ann. section 76-6-302 (1978)
(1) A person commits aggravated robbery if in the
course of committing robbery, he:
(a) Uses a firearm or a facsimile of a
firearm, knife or a facsimile of a knife or a
deadly weapon; or
(b) Causes
serious
bodily
injury upon
another.
(2) Aggravated robbery is a felony of the first
degree.
(3) For the purposes of this part, an act shall be
deemed to be "in the course of committing a robbery" if
it occurs in an
attempt to
commit, during the
commission of, or in the immediate flight after the
attempt or commission of a robbery.
Utah Code Ann. section 76-3-203
A person who has been convicted of a felony may be
sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate term as
follows:
(1) In the case of a felony of the first
degree, for a term at not less than five
years, unless otherwise specifically provided
by law, and which may be for life but if the
trier of fact finds a firearm or a facsimile
or the representation of a firearm was used
in the commission or furtherance of the
felony, the court shall additionally sentence
the person convicted for a term of one year
to run consecutively and not concurrently;
and the court may additionally sentence the
person convicted for an indeterminate term of
one year
to run
consecutively and not
concurrently; and the court may additionally
sentence
the
person
convicted
for an
indeterminate term not to exceed five years
to run consecutively and not concurrently;
(2) In the case of a felony of the
second degree, for a term at not less than
one year nor more than 15 years but if the

trier of fact finds a firearm or a facsimile
or the representation of a firearm was used
in the commission or furtherance of the
felony, the court shall additionally sentence
the person convicted for a term of one year
to run consecutively and not concurrently;
and the court may additionally sentence the
person convicted for an indeterminate term
not to exceed five years to run consecutively
and not concurrently;
(3) In the case of a felony of the third
degree, for a term not to exceed five years
but if the trier of fact finds a firearm or a
facsimile or the representation of a firearm
was used in the commission or furtherance of
the
felony,
the court may additionally
sentence
the
person
convicted
for an
indeterminate term not to exceed five years
to run consecutively and not concurrently.
(4) Any person who has been sentenced to
a term of imprisonment for a felony in which
a firearm was used or involved
in the
accomplishment
of
the
felony
and
is
convicted of another felony when a firearm
was used or involved in the accomplishment of
the felony shall, in addition to any other
sentence
imposed,
be
sentenced for an
indeterminate term to be not less than five
nor more than ten years to run consecutively
and not concurrently.
Utah Court of Appeals Rule 35
...The petition [for rehearing]
shall state with
particularity the points of law or fact which the
petitioner claims
the
court
has
overlooked or
misapprehended and shall contain such argument in
support of the petition as the petitioner so desires.
Counsel for the petitioner must certify that the
petition is presented in good faith and not for delay.
Utah Rule of Evidence 801(c)
Hearsay is a statement, other than one made by the
declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing,
offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter
asserted.
Utah Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3)
[In order to qualify under the statement against
interest exception to the hearsay rule, a statement
must be a] statement which at the time of its making so
far
contrary
to
the
declarant's
pecuniary or

proprietary interest, or so far tended to subject him
to civil or criminal liability, .•• that a reasonable
man in his position would not have made the statement
unless he believed it to be true.

